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NOTE
THE ULTIMATE DISILLUSIONMENT: THE NEED
FOR JURY TRIALS IN JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS
Cart Rixey+
Juvenile courts were created at the turn of the century to remove juvenile
offenders from the harsh grasp of the adult criminal justice system.I Pioneers
of the juvenile court movement sought to treat juvenile offenders the way
physicians treat infants: when infants are sick, their illnesses are first
2
diagnosed and then individually treated in a way that best allows them to heal.
Despite the commendable intentions of newly established juvenile systems,
"the informality and private nature of the proceedings resulted in little public
oversight and led to arbitrary dispositions with indeterminate and punitive
sentences." 3  Even before the U.S. Supreme Court extended some of the
procedural due process rights to juveniles as a result of the failing juvenile
system, critics questioned the applicability and measured success of a distinct
juvenile justice system. In 1966, Justice Fortas questioned the juvenile justice
system when he noted "that there may be grounds for concern that the child
receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children."
4
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has extended nearly all of the procedural
due process rights to juveniles, the Court has stopped short of granting
juveniles a constitutional right to a jury trial.5 Citing public policy reasons
+ J.D. candidate 2010, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.
2004, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author wishes to thank Professor
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1. See Courtney P. Fain, Note, What's In a Name? The Worrisome Interchange of Juvenile
"Adjudications" with Criminal "Convictions ", 49 B.C. L. REV. 495, 498-99 (2008).
2. See Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America's "Juvenile
Injustice System ", 22 PEPP. L. REV. 907, 910 (1995).
3. Fain, supra note 1, at 500.
4. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
5. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1971) (plurality opinion). But
see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (applying a reasonable doubt standard to juvenile
delinquency proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34, 41, 55, 57 (1967) (conferring the due
process rights of notice, representation by counsel, freedom from self-incrimination, and the
ability to confront and cross-examine witnesses to juveniles); Kent, 383 U.S. at 554 (extending
many due process protections, such as a right to counsel and a fair hearing to juvenile waiver
proceedings).
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concerning the rehabilitative nature of juvenile proceedings, as well as the
separate and distinct nature of juvenile adjudications, a divided Court in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania declined to extend to juveniles the right to a jury
trial during a juvenile adjudication.6  Although the Court's public policy
considerations may have been relevant in 1971, they are now inapposite
because of the growing similarity between juvenile and criminal codes as well
as the changing nature ofjuvenile proceedings.
The case of In re L.M came to the Kansas Supreme Court after the Kansas
intermediate appellate court applied U.S. and Kansas Supreme Court precedent
to affirm the trial court's decision to deny L.M.'s motion for a jury trial.7 After
granting review of the case, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts,8 declining to follow the precedent set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court,9
the Kansas Supreme Court,' 0 and the courts of sister jurisdictions, including,
Colorado," New York,'2 the District of Columbia, 3 Washington,' 4 Arizona,' 5
Louisiana, 16 and North Dakota. 17 The Kansas Supreme Court held instead that
juveniles do, in fact, have a constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Kansas
Constitution.
18
This Note examines a juvenile's right to a jury trial. It begins by discussing
the history of the juvenile justice system, and continues with an exploration of
6. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545-50.
7. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 165-66 (Kan. 2008).
8. Id. at 172 (reversing and remanding the case for ajury trial).
9. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550-51.
10. See Findlay v. State, 681 P.2d 20, 24 (Kan. 1984).
11. See A.C. v. State, 16 P.3d 240, 241 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (holding that the trial court's
discretion to deny a juvenile a jury trial did not violate the juvenile's due process rights under the
Colorado Constitution or the U.S. Constitution).
12. See In re Janet R., 353 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (App. Div. 1974) (holding that committing a
juvenile to an adult correctional facility after a hearing before a judge, instead of a jury, was not
violative of the New York Constitution).
13. In re J.T., 290 A.2d 821, 825 (D.C. 1972) (determining that the statute providing for the
adjudication of juvenile cases without a jury does not violate due process or the Sixth
Amendment).
14. See State v. J.H., 978 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that sufficient
distinctions exist between the juvenile system and the adult criminal system to warrant denying
juvenile offenders the right to ajury trial).
15. See David G. v. Pollard, 86 P.3d 364, 370 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc) (indicating that a city
court judge did not have the authority to mandate that ajuvenile be tried by ajury under the Rules
of Criminal Procedure).
16. See State ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26, 34 (La. 2002) (relying on prior case law in holding
that juveniles do not enjoy the right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings under the Due Process
Clause).
17. See In re R.Y., 189 N.W.2d 644, 653 (N.D. 1971) (holding that juveniles are not
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial under the Due Process Clause).
18. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 171, 172 (Kan. 2008).
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key U.S. Supreme Court decisions that extended various procedural due
process rights to juveniles. Next, this Note discusses the decisions of several
state courts that have declined to extend to juveniles the constitutional right to
a jury trial. It then analyzes the Kansas Supreme Court's recent decision, In re
L.M, which gave juveniles the right to a jury trial based on its interpretation of
the Kansas Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. Finally, this Note will demonstrate that the Kansas Supreme
Court correctly held that the reasoning and public policy considerations of
MeKeiver v. Pennsylvania no longer apply because of the changing and
increasingly punitive nature of juvenile codes.
I. THE RIGHTS OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE ADJUDICATORY
SYSTEM
A. Establishment of Juvenile Courts
Prior to the turn of the twentieth century, juveniles and adults were treated
similarly under the criminal common law.' 9 However, disadvantaged youths
were often imprisoned without having been convicted, or were jailed for
offenses not considered severe enough to have resulted in the imprisonment of
an adult.
20
The nineteenth century's "birth of the Progressive movement" ignited
passionate pleas for changes to the system of juvenile adjudication.21 At the
end of the nineteenth century, individual states finally began to explore ways to
more effectively deal with juveniles by enacting laws directed at treating
22
juvenile offenders differently from their adult counterparts. In 1899, the
Illinois legislature created in Cook County, Illinois the first juvenile court in
19. See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106 (1909).
20. Carla J. Stovall, Justice and Juveniles in Kansas: Where We Have Been and Where We
Are Headed, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1999). Julian W. Mack commented that: "The
result of it all was that instead of the state's training its bad boys so as to make of them decent
citizens, it permitted them to become the outlaws and outcasts of society; it criminalized them by
the very methods that it used in dealing with them." Mack, supra note 19, at 107.
21. Tina Chen, Comment, The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial: Why is it a
Fundamental Right for Adults and Not Juveniles?, 28 J. JUV. L. 1, 2 (2007). Supporters of the
Progressive movement stressed that youths were "products of their environments" and "could be
controlled if [they] had stability in their homes." Jessica L. Anders, Note, Bad Children or a Bad
System: Problems in Federal Interpretation of a Delinquent's Prior Record in Determining the
Appropriateness of a Discretionary Judicial Waiver, 50 VILL. L. REV. 227, 231 (2005).
Reformers sought the creation of a separate system that would allow the state to act as a guardian
for juvenile offenders in order to protect the best interests of the child. See id.
22. See DeBacker v. Brainard, 161 N.W.2d 508, 509-10 (Neb. 1968) (McCown, J.). The
early "pioneer" juvenile courts faced numerous difficulties, including "a complete lack of privacy
for the juvenile in the record of the court, no open forum, no separate buildings for juvenile
proceedings, and inadequate funds for salaries and buildings." Gerald P. Hill, II, Revisiting
Juvenile Justice: The Requirement for Jury Trials in Juvenile Proceedings Under the Sixth
Amendment, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 143, 145 (2008).
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the country in response to complaints that youth offenders were being treated
too harshly. Adopting a parens patriae philosophy, 24 the Illinois Act
mandated that juvenile records be kept confidential and required that juveniles
and adults be incarcerated in separate buildings when detained in the same
facility. 25 Perhaps most importantly, the new system also instilled objectives
of rehabilitation and treatment, and provided for more informal procedures
than those required by the criminal court.26
Following the enactment of the Illinois Act in 1899, every state worked to
create separate procedures for juvenile offenders.27 States based their newly
established juvenile court systems on the theory that children should neither be
"punished in the same fashion, nor under the same process and procedures, as
adult criminals., 28 The new juvenile laws were designed "to help, not punish,
the child ' 29 and were intended to be beneficial and rehabilitative rather than
punitive. Advocates for children encouraged the development of a
23. Anita Nabha, Note, Shuffling to Justice: Why Children Should Not Be Shackled in
Court, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1549, 1559 (2008).
24. The Latin phrase, parens patriae, means "parent of his or her country," and is defined as
"the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004). Parens patriae stands for the proposition "that
the state is the higher or the ultimate parent of all of the dependents within its borders." See
Mack, supra note 19, at 104. Furthermore, Justice Fortas explained in In re Gault that the Latin
phrase "was taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power of
the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person
of the child." 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
25. Stovall, supra note 20, at 1024.
26. Id.
27. See Daniel M. Vannella, Note, Let the Jury Do the Waive: How Apprendi v. New Jersey
Applies to Juvenile Transfer Proceedings, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 729 (2006). Within
twenty years, every state had created some version of a juvenile court system. Id. In 1938, the
federal court system followed the states' lead and created the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
(FJDA), which adopted separate procedures for juvenile adjudications. Anders, supra note 21, at
238-39.
28. DeBacker v. Brainard, 161 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Neb. 1968) (McCown, J.).
29. State ex rel. Miller v. Bryant, 144 N.W. 804, 804 (Neb. 1913). One proponent of the
juvenile system explained the goals of the new system:
The creators of the juvenile court envisioned that this special court for children would
be less like a court and more like a social welfare agency. Children . . . were to be
helped rather than punished. There was to be less concern with determining guilt or
innocence and more emphasis on identifying the causes of a child's misbehavior and
prescribing individualized treatment. As stated earlier, children were not to be
subjected "to the rigors of formal criminal trials" but were to be handled informally. In
exchange for this informality, they were denied the rights and procedural safeguards
accorded to adults.
IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 151 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
30. See DeBacker, 161 N.W.2d at 510. Creators of the new juvenile systems believed it was
unwise and inadequate to shuffle children through the criminal system in the same manner as
adult offenders, and instead, they strived to portray the judge as a parental figure whose goal was
[Vol. 58:885
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specialized system in which "courts focused on each child's characteristics,
background, and needs, and determined an appropriate treatment plan to heal
the child and enable him to participate in society."
It was not long before Kansas followed the lead of Illinois and adopted
legislation specific to the adjudication of juveniles.32 The Kansas legislature
adopted a law similar to the Illinois Act that created in each county a juvenile
court that exercised jurisdiction over "the care of dependent, neglected and
delinquent children." As states began adopting special juvenile proceedings,
the courts next faced the question of what rights should be extended to
juveniles within these unique systems.
B. Procedural Protections Guaranteed Under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
On appeal before the Kansas Supreme Court, the juvenile in In re L.M
rooted his arguments in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial,,35 ,r
jury of the State .. . The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part:
to guide and assist the misguided youths who populated the system. Nabha, supra note 23, at
1560-61.
31. Nabha, supra note 23, at 1561. This focus on "'individualized justice' has been
described as "'the assertion that each juvenile should be appraised and treated according to
individual needs."' Hill, supra note 22, at 161 (quoting M.A. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE
COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE 243 (1982)). Creators of the
juvenile system sought to instill in children "powerful lessons about fairness, equality, and
justice-the three pillars of our democracy." Nabha, supra note 23, at 1587. As one scholar
noted, "'[tihe school and court are bound in an intricate public mission: to teach, to care for, to
sanction the young."' Id. (quoting Bernardine Dohm, The School, the Child, and the Court, in A
CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 267, 267-69 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002)).
32. Stovall, supra note 20, at 1025. In 1905, the Governor of Kansas delivered a speech to
the State Senate in which he urged the legislature to authorize a
"juvenile court system" for the benefit of young people who commit certain offenses
against the law. Under this system, where it has been tried, many of these young
offenders have been saved the disgrace of a jail experience, and society has been better
protected than under the more severe modes of treatment.
Id. at 1024 (quoting Larry R. Rute, In the Beginning: The Creation of the Kansas Juvenile Court
System, ACT NEWSL. (The Adoptions in Child Time Project, Topeka, Kan.), July 1998, at 11).
33. Id. at 1025 (quoting Act of Mar. 4, 1905, ch. 190, § 1, 1905 Kan. Sess. Laws 264, 264
(repealed 1957)).
34. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 166 (Kan. 2008). L.M.'s three main arguments were that: (1)
revisions to the Kansas Juvenile Justice Code had deteriorated the rehabilitative objectives of the
juvenile system, thus requiring the court to extend to juveniles the constitutional right to a jury
trial; (2) "juveniles are entitled to a jury trial under the Kansas Constitution"; and (3) "regardless
of whether all juveniles are constitutionally entitled to a jury [trial under the federal and Kansas
Constitutions], he should have received one because he ran the risk of having to register as a sex
offender." Id. at 167-68.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2009]
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"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... 36 Based
on its determination that the system of juvenile adjudication is now more
similar to the adult criminal justice system, the Kansas Supreme Court
concluded that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that "juveniles
have a constitutional right to a jury trial. 37
C. Procedural Due Process Rights Extended to Juveniles by the U.S. Supreme
Court
The lack of constitutional protections afforded to juvenile offenders "led to a
new wave of reform in the 1960s [and was the result of] little progress and
significant defects in the juvenile court system." 38 Reformers complained that
juveniles did not enjoy the same due process rights injuvenile court that were
afforded to defendants in the criminal justice system. 39 As a result, over the
course of the past half-century, the U.S. Supreme Court has accorded juvenile
offenders nearly all of the constitutional rights that are enjoyed by adults who
commit similar acts.4 ° Though the Court has extended to juveniles the rights to
confrontation, cross-examination, notice and counsel, as well as the right to
protection against self-incrimination and the right for their cases to be tried
under a reasonable doubt standard of proof, the Supreme Court has held that
youth offenders do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile
proceedings.
4 1
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37. InreL.M, 186 P.3d at 170.
38. Courtney R. Clark, Note, Collateral Damage: How Closing Juvenile Delinquency
Proceedings Flouts the Constitution and Fails to Benefit the Child, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv.
199, 204 (2007). By the 1960s, problems within the juvenile system began to "demonstrate[] that
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle
and procedure." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
39. See Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should
Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 530 (2004).
40. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
41. Compare Breed, 421 U.S. at 541 (holding that the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause applies to juvenile adjudications), In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 368 (applying the reasonable
doubt standard to juvenile proceedings), In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-34, 34-42, 42-57 (granting
juveniles the right to counsel, notice, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses), and
Kent, 383 U.S. at 552-53, 562 (extending the protections of the Due Process Clause to waiver
hearings in juvenile proceedings), with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971)
(plurality opinion) (denying youth offenders the right to a jury trial in juvenile adjudications).
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1. Kent v. United States: Due Process Applies to Waiver Hearings in
Juvenile Court
In Kent v. United States, one of the first cases decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court on the issue of the rights of juvenile offenders, the Court dealt narrowly
with the process by which Zyouth offenders are transferred to criminal court in
order to be tried as adults. Noting that a decision on waiver of jurisdiction
and transfer can bring hefty differences in sentencing, the Court determined
that juveniles are entitled to certain procedures during the transfer process,
including a hearing, access by representative counsel to the probation records,
as well as a statement by the juvenile court for its decision.43 The Court's
ruling that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution applied to waiver
hearings in juvenile proceedings was especially significant because the Court
had not previously applied the Due Process Clause to children in juvenile
court.44
2. In re Gault: Juveniles Are Afforded Various Procedural Due Process
Rights
Less than a year later, the Supreme Court decided In re Gault,45 still
considered one of the most important cases regarding the rights of children in
46juvenile proceedings. In declaring that "'neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,' ' 47 the Court set a new constitutional
42. Kent, 383 U.S. at 552. Prior to its decision in Kent, the Court had twice refused to hear
cases involving juvenile adjudication practices. See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., The Right to a Public
Jury Trial: A Need for Today's Juvenile Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230, 231 & n.7 (1993) (citing
People v. Lewis, 183 N.E. 353 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1932); In re Holmes, 109 A.2d
523 (Pa. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955)).
43. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557. With its decision in Kent, the Court "committed itself to steering
a middle course regarding rights in juvenile court." Sanborn, supra note 42, at 232. The Kent
Court determined that it "would neither tolerate a totally rights-free juvenile court, because that
had produced abuses, nor insist that juvenile court adopt all rights enjoyed in criminal court,
because equality of this sort could bring about the demise ofjuvenile court." Id.
44. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 557; Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal
Significance of Adolescent Development Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re
Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 125, 133 (2007) (noting that Kent was "the first case [the Supreme
Court] had ever decided involving the juvenile court process"). The Court explained in Kent that
the juvenile court could not "determine in isolation and without the participation or any
representation of the child the 'critically important' question whether a child will be deprived of
the special protections and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act." Kent, 383 U.S. at 553 (quoting
Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).
45. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
46. See Irene Merker Rosenberg, Gault Turns 40: Reflections on Ambiguity, 44 No. 3 CRIM.
L. BULL. 330, 331 (2008) (describing Gault as "an extraordinary case that changed the legal
landscape by imposing constitutional fetters on the lawless juvenile court system that prevailed in
this country in 1967").
47. Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court-A
Promise Unfulfilled, 44 No. 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 372 (2008) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. at
13).
2009]
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standard and "changed the nation's juvenile courts forever."48  Among the
rights afforded to juvenile offenders in Gault were the rights to notice of the
charges brought against them,49 representation by counsel,50 the right to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, 51 and the right to protection
52against self-incrimination. In essence, the Gault Court sought to strike a fair
balance in maintaining the commitment to rehabilitation and treatment of
juveniles, while expanding the protective rights available to children in
juvenile proceedings. 3
3. In re Winship: The Right for Juveniles to Have Their Cases Tried under
the Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof
In 1970, the Court examined the standard of proof required in juvenile
proceedings in In re Winship.54 Concluding that the reasonable doubt standard
"plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure," the Court
"explicitly [held] that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 55  The Court
explained that the reasonable doubt standard was essential to protect society
from questioning whether those condemned were actually guilty, a likely result
56from a less-stringent standard.
4. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The U.S. Supreme Court Does Not Extend the
Right to a Jury Trial to Juvenile Offenders
The Court's drastic expansion of juveniles' constitutional rights in the
preceding five years encountered a major setback with the Court's 1971
48. Id. One commentator postulates that the holding in Gault was both broad and narrow:
broad on the one hand, because no Supreme Court case had ever determined that enumerated
Constitutional rights applied to juveniles, and narrow on the other hand, because it failed to
address pre- and post-trial procedures as well as other constitutional rights such as jury trials,
speedy trials, double jeopardy, and appellate rights. Id. at 372-73.
49. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33.
50. Id. at41.
51. Id. at56-57.
52. Id. at 55.
53. See Mlyniec, supra note 47, at 395-96. The holding in Gault exemplifies the struggles
faced by the Supreme Court in distinguishing between youth and adult offenders: the Gault Court
maintained that the Bill of Rights was not merely for adults, yet stopped short of extending all
procedural due process rights to youth offenders in juvenile proceedings. See Elisa Poncz,
Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper v. Simmons: "Kids Are Just Different" and "Kids Are
Like Adults" Advocacy Strategies, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 273, 278 (2008).
54. 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970).
55. Id. at 363-64.
56. Id. at 364 ("It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his
ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.").
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decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.57 Noting that the jury is not a necessary
component of accurate fact-finding, the Court held, in a plurali opinion, that
a jury trial in a juvenile proceeding is not a constitutional right. 8 Though the
divided court could not agree on the reasoning to support its holding, four of
the justices supported the decision, citing numerous policy considerations and
speculations about the impact of jury trials on juvenile proceedings.
59
The plurality observed that historically the Court had abstained from
affirming outright that all constitutional rights conferred upon adult offenders
should be afforded to juveniles. The Justices also contemplated the
possibility that a constitutionally mandated jury trial would "remake the
juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process," thereby eliminating the
"idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding."
61
In addition to citing three published procedural guides that "stopp[ed] short
of proposing the jury trial for juvenile proceedings," 62 the Court also noted that
a recent Task Force Report released by the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice did not suggest that jury trials
57. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
58. Id. at 545 (plurality opinion) ("Despite all these disappointments [with the juvenile
system], all these failures, and all these shortcomings, we conclude that trial by jury in the
juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement."). In his dissent, Justice
Douglas maintained that "where a State uses its juvenile court proceedings to prosecute a juvenile
for a criminal act and to order 'confinement' until the child reaches 21 years of age ... then he is
entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult." Id. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 545-51 (plurality opinion). Two concurring Justices relied on other reasoning to
deny juveniles the right of a jury trial. Justice White focused on the differences between criminal
and juvenile courts, finding those distinctions, standing alone, to be dispositive. Id. at 553
(White, J., concurring). Justice Brennan relied on due process, reasoning that the particular
characteristics of the juvenile system provided the juvenile with adequate protection against
governmental oppression and therefore, satisfied the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 553-54 (Brennan,
J., concurring). Justice Harlan also concurred with the plurality's holding, but based his
reasoning on his belief that in state proceedings, jury trials, even in criminal cases, were not
required under the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause. Id at 557 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Conversely, the three dissenting Justices found support in Justice Fortas's assertion
in In re Gault that "'neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone.' Id at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)). The
dissenting Justices maintained that juveniles charged with and prosecuted for criminal acts
involving a potential loss of liberty should be afforded the same constitutional protections as
adults accused of similar crimes. Id. at 559-60.
60. Id. at 545 (plurality opinion) ("'It is clear to us that the Supreme Court has properly
attempted to strike a judicious balance by injecting procedural orderliness into the juvenile court
system."' (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 234 A.2d 9, 15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967))).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 549-50. The Court cited the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, § 24(a), approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July 1968; the Standard
Juvenile Court Act, Article V, § 19, proposed by the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency; and the Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts, § 29(a). Id.
2009]
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should be instituted in the juvenile adjudicative process. 63  Acknowledging
recommendations by a Senate Committee, the Court hypothesized that the
imposition of jury trials on the juvenile system would lead to "the traditional
delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the
public trial."64
Noting that the Court, in dicta in Duncan v. Louisiana, a mere three years
before, had proposed that a jury is not a mandatory component of every "fair
and equitable" criminal proceeding,65 the Court pointed to thirteen states that,
when dealing with similar issues, concluded that In re Gault and Duncan "do
not compel trial by jury in the juvenile court.,
66
The Court hypothesized that instituting a jury trial into juvenile
adjudications would hinder, rather than strengthen, "the fact-finding function,
and would . . . place the juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal
process.' 67 Despite recognizing dissatisfaction with the juvenile system,68 the
Court refused to acknowledge that any existing abuses within the system were
"of constitutional dimension" 69 and noted its willingness to permit states to
explore new ways to deal with the detrimental issues that permeated the
63. Id. at 544-46 ("Had the Commission deemed this vital to the integrity of the juvenile
process, or to the handling of juveniles, surely a recommendation or suggestion to this effect
would have appeared." (citing LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 7-9 (1967))). The Commission's lack of
a recommendation for implementation of juvenile jury trials was perhaps attributable to the fact
that it was published before the Supreme Court's In re Gault decision, which was one of the first
cases to expand significantly the constitutional rights ofjuveniles. See id. at 545.
64. Id. at 550.
65. Id. at 547 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14, 158 (1968)). The
Duncan Court made the following observation in a footnote: "A criminal process which was fair
and equitable but used no juries is easy to imagine. It would make use of alternative guarantees
and protections which would serve the purposes that the jury serves in the English and American
systems." Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n. 14. However, the Duncan Court ultimately concluded:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury
trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.
Id. at 149.
66. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 549 (plurality opinion). See, e.g., In re Fucini, 255 N.E.2d 380
(I1. 1970); Bible v. State, 254 N.E.2d 319 (Ind. 1970); Hopkins v. Youth Court, 227 So. 2d 282
(Miss. 1969); State v. Turner, 453 P.2d 910 (Or. 1969).
67. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547 (plurality opinion) (positing that imposing the jury trial
would "provide an attrition of the juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a unique
manner").
68. See id.
69. Id. at 547-48 ("[The abuses in the system] relate to the lack of resources and of
dedication rather than to inherent [constitutional] unfairness.").
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juvenile adjudicatory process. 70  In addition to its observation that juvenile
court judges are not prevented from using advisory juries, 71 the Court also
noted that (at the time) thirty-four states and the District of Columbia had
either statutes or case law that effectively denied juveniles the right to a jury
72trial in similar cases. The Court acknowledged, yet seemed inclined to
dismiss, the fact that an additional ten states provided a jury trial to juveniles in
certain circumstances.73
Lastly, the Court expressed concern over the possibility that prejudgment by
a juvenile judge who has had prior access to the juvenile, his record, and his
social files could disregard certain aspects of fairness in the juvenile
adjudicatory system.74  After laying out the various policy considerations
concerning the potential impact of juvenile jury trials, the Court concluded that
if the jury procedures of the adult criminal justice process were injected into
the juvenile system, there would be no need for a separate juvenile system.75
D. Treatment by State Courts
In the nearly forty years since the U.S. Supreme Court decided McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, many state courts have determined that the disallowance of the
right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings does not violate a juvenile's rights
70. Id. at 547 ("If, in its wisdom, any State feels the jury trial is desirable in all cases, or in
certain kinds, there appears to be no impediment to its installing a system embracing that
feature.").
71. Id. at 548. The federal rules, as well as the rules of some states, allow for the use of
advisory juries "in actions which are not triable of right by a jury." 41 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 92
(2008). The court is not bound by a decision of an advisory jury, but instead "may accept or
reject the advisory jury's verdict." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 873 (8th ed. 2004).
72. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 548-49 & nn.7-8 (plurality opinion). However, the Court
correctly recognized that "' [t]he fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is not
conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due process ....' Id. at 548
(quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952)).
73. Id. at 549 & n.9.
74. Id. at 550. The Court asserted that these concerns, and their presence in the juvenile
system, "ignore ... every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention
that the juvenile court system contemplates." Id.
75. Id. at 551. One critic of McKeiver points out that
the McKeiver Court did not analyze the crucial distinctions between treatment in
juvenile courts and punishment in criminal courts that justified different procedural
safeguards for each forum. No factual record of dispositional practices or conditions of
confinement was reviewed by the Court in its deliberation over whether juvenile court
intervention was punishment or treatment. The Court simply noted that the ideal
juvenile court system is an "intimate, informal protective proceeding," even while
acknowledging that the "ideal" is seldom, if ever, realized.
Hill, supra note 22, at 159 (quoting Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of
Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 830-31
(1988)).
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under either the U.S. Constitution or the applicable state constitution. 76  To
support their holdings, state courts have relied on stare decisis, rooting their
decisions in the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as similar clauses in applicable
state constitutions.77 The following four cases provide examples of the various
bases on which state courts have relied in denying juveniles the constitutional
right to a jury trial.
1. Disallowing Juveniles the Right to a Jury Trial Does Not Violate the Due
Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
One of the first lower-level courts to interpret and apply the McKeiver
78decision was the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. In 1972, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals held, in In re J. T., that a statute mandating that
all delinquency proceedings be heard without a jury trial before the Family
Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia did not violate the
Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.79
The court of appeals relied heavily on McKeiver in determining that the
District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 met
"the due process standard of fundamental faimess."80 The court explained that
76. See, e.g., A.C. v. State, 16 P.3d 240, 245 (Colo. 2001); In re J.T., 290 A.2d 821, 825
(D.C. 1972); In reJ.H., 978 P.2d 1121, 1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
77. See, e.g., AC., 16 P.3d at 243-44; In reJ.T, 290 A.2d at 824-25; In reJ.H., 978 P.2d at
1131.
78. In re J. T., 290 A.2d at 822. Several state courts ruled on whether a juvenile had a right
to a jury trial prior to the Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver. See, e.g., DeBacker v.
Brainard, 161 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Neb. 1968) (dismissing a juvenile offender's petition alleging
that a relevant section of the Juvenile Court Act was unconstitutional because it denied him the
right to ajury trial); In re R.Y., 189 N.W.2d 644, 653 (N.D. 1971) (holding that youth offenders
are not entitled to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings). Interestingly, four of the seven Nebraska
Supreme Court judges in DeBacker were of the opinion that the specific section of the statute was
in fact unconstitutional in that it denied the juvenile offender the right to a jury trial. DeBacker,
161 N.W.2d at 513. Although only three judges found the statute constitutional, the Nebraska
Constitution provided in part: "No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except by the
concurrence of five judges." NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2. Thus, even though only a minority of the
judges found the statute constitutional, the court was required to affirm the judgment dismissing
the youth's petition regarding his fight to ajury trial. DeBacker, 161 N.W.2d at 513.
79. In re JT., 290 A.2d at 825. In re JT. included the consolidation of several appeals
involving defendants who were charged with the commission of "non-petty criminal offense[s]."
Id. at 821. The trial judge in each case denied the defendants' motion requesting a jury trial,
before ultimately deciding in a bench trial that the defendants had committed the acts as charged.
Id. at 821-22.
80. Id. at 825. The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970
was mirrored after a provision of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act (UJCA). Id. at 822. The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the UJCA and
recommended it for enactment by all fifty states in 1968. Id. at 822 & n.3. The Act was almost
immediately endorsed by the American Bar Association and states in relevant part: "The Division
shall, without a jury, hear and adjudicate cases involving delinquency .... D.C. CODE § 16-
2316(a) (Supp. IV 1971) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 58:885
The Need for Jury Trials in Juvenile Adjudications
although the D.C. Code did not give juveniles the right to a jury trial, it
incorporated other elements that the justice system acknowledged as essential
predicates to a juvenile's fair hearing, and the court noted that those rights
served to protect the child's due process rights.s The court noted that it had
"no good reason to believe that the full imposition of all the procedures and
requirements of an adult criminal trial would benefit either the child or the
community."
82
2. Denying Juveniles the Right to a Jury Trial Does Not Violate State and
Federal Guarantees of Equal Protection
In comparison, despite the creation of and numerous subsequent alterations
to Washington's Juvenile Justice Code, Washington state courts have
continually relied on McKeiver and prior state court precedent in holding that
juveniles do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial.83 For example, in In
re J.H., the Washington Court of Appeals relied on the state's prior precedent
in affirming that statutes disallowing juveniles the right to a jury trial do not
violate the guarantees of equal protection under the state and federal
constitutions. The court explained that the lack of a jury trial contributes to
the "unique rehabilitative nature of juvenile proceedings" and does not infringe
upon the child's equal protection guarantees.
85
81. In re J.T, 290 A.2d at 825. The District of Columbia's Juvenile Code afforded a child
and his parents the right to notice and a copy of the petition, as well as the right to counsel. Id. at
app. 825-26. The Code also provided the child with the right to be present at the fact-finding
hearing, the right to confrontation and the right to cross-examine witnesses. See id.
82. Id. at 825; see also State ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26, 34 (La. 2002) (holding that a jury
trial in a juvenile adjudication is "not constitutionally required under the applicable due process
standard in juvenile proceedings").
83. See, e.g., State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240, 250 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) ("[T]he
legislature's statutory denial ofjury trials to juveniles is rationally related to its desire to preserve
some of the unique aspects of the juvenile court system."); State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 773-74
(Wash. 1979) (en banc) (relying on McKeiver); Estes v. Hopp, 438 P.2d 205, 208 (Wash. 1968)
(en banc) ("One of the substantial benefits of the juvenile process is a private, informal hearing
conducted outside the presence of the jury."). In Lawley, the court provided three reasons why it
believed that the state legislature had not intended to treat juvenile offenders the same as adults.
Lawley, 591 P.2d at 773. First, the court explained that the legislature determined that holding
juvenile offenders accountable as a group for their criminal behavior rehabilitated them roughly
as effectively as efforts focused on the particular characteristics of each youth. See id. Second,
the court also maintained that the legislature had included several provisions providing guidance
on the administration of its treatment of juvenile offenders. Id. Third, the court concluded that
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a jury trial is not mandated under the U.S. Constitution.
Id. at 773-74.
84. In re J.H., 978 P.2d 1121, 1123-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
85. Id. at 1131. Despite the court's recognition that juvenile adjudications are increasingly
similar to adult criminal proceedings, the court concluded that the two systems remain distinct
enough to allow for the denial of the fight to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. Id. at 1130.
Satisfied with the protections afforded to youth offenders under the present juvenile system, the
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Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court determined in A.C. v. State that
juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial under the federal and state constitutions,
and that treating juveniles and adults differently with respect to the right to a
jury trial does not constitute a violation of equal protection.
86
In upholding the decisions of the lower courts, 87 the Colorado Supreme
Court articulated that the state statute only required a jury trial when the
juvenile was charged with a violent crime or charged as an aggravated
offender.88 The court relied on McKeiver v. Pennsylvania in support of its
conclusion that because the statute provided the trial judge with discretion to
grant or deny the juvenile a jury trial, the trial judge did not err in his decision,
and did not deprive the juvenile of his guarantees under the Equal Protection
Clause, given the charges filed against the juvenile.
89
3. A Judge Cannot Mandate a Jury Trial for a Juvenile Offender under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
The Supreme Court of Arizona took a different approach. In response to the
state's assertion that the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure apply in juvenile
proceedings, the court held that a city court judge, sitting as a juvenile hearing
officer, could not apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and mandate
a jury trial.90 The court reasoned that requiring a juvenile to be tried by a jury
court reasoned that it did not need to compromise those special protections by fully aligning
juvenile adjudications with adult criminal proceedings. Id. at 1129.
86. A.C. v. State, 16 P.3d 240, 243, 245 (Colo. 2001). After the state filed a delinquency
petition accusing the juvenile of an act, which if committed by an adult would have been a felony
of reckless manslaughter, the juvenile moved for a jury trial under an applicable section of the
Children's Code. Id. at 241.
87. The trial court had determined that the statute did not create a jury trial right and denied
subsequent motions filed by A.C. claiming that he had a right to a jury trial under Colorado law
and the U.S. Constitution. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding
that under the State and Federal Constitutions a juvenile is not afforded the right to a jury trial in
juvenile proceedings. Id.
88. Id. at 242-43.
89. Id. at 243-45 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality
opinion)). The court also dictated that because "a jury trial is not a fundamental right for
juveniles in delinquency proceedings, an equal protection violation occurs only if the legislative
classification is unreasonable and bears no rational relationship to legitimate state objectives." Id.
at 245.
90. David G. v. Pollard, 86 P.3d 364, 370 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc). After being charged with
two criminal offenses related to his involvement in a high-speed chase, fourteen-year-old David
G. filed a motion to dismiss the charges claiming that his due process rights had been violated
because the trial court judge refused to comply with the Arizona Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Id.
at 364-65. Denying the juvenile's motion, the trial court set the matter for a jury trial, concluding
"'[t]hat the Rules of Criminal Procedure in so far as they do not conflict with the Rules of
Juvenile Procedure guarantee the protection of due process rights."' Id. at 365 (quoting the trial
court decision). When the case was appealed, David G. argued that "only the Juvenile Rules of
Procedure" should apply, while the State took the position that trial courts could deviate from the
Rules of Juvenile Procedure and "fill the gap by applying the Rules of Criminal Procedure." Id.
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instead of the bench "does not promote the informality and flexibility that the
juvenile courts strive to achieve and subjects the juvenile to the very stigma the
legislature sought to prevent."
91
E. Prior Treatment by the Kansas Supreme Court in Findlay v. State
Prior to 2008, the precedent in Kansas on the constitutionality of jury trials
in juvenile proceedings was similar to that of sister states:juveniles did not
enjoy the right to a jury trial in juvenile adjudications. 92 In 1984, the Kansas
Supreme Court held, in Findlay v. State, that under the Kansas Juvenile
Offenders Code (KJOC),93 there was no federal or state constitutional right to a
jury trial in juvenile adjudications.
94
Relying on section 38-1601 of the KJOC,95 the court determined that there
was no constitutional right, either federal or state, to a jury trial in juvenile
proceedings. 96 The court noted that its holding was consistent with its ownprior decisions made before the 1982 adoption of the KJOC.97
at 367. The Arizona Supreme Court struck a balance between the two positions, holding that
"strict application of the Juvenile Rules of Procedure" was not necessary, yet also explaining that
the Rules of Criminal Procedure applied only to "criminal proceedings," and thus did not apply to
David because of his status as a juvenile. Id. at 368 (emphasis omitted). Citing the special
interests that characterize the juvenile court system, the court held that a trial court judge could
not apply the Rules of Criminal Procedure and mandate that a juvenile be tried by a jury. Id. at
370.
91. Id. at 370.
92. Findlay v. State, 681 P.2d 20, 22 (Kan. 1984).
93. The KJOC was repealed in 2006. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1601 et seq. (1993) (repealed
2006). As Findlay was decided in 1984, the KJOC was still good law at the time of the decision.
See Findlay, 681 P.2d at 22; see also In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 168 (Kan. 2008).
94. Findlay, 681 P.2d at 22. Appellant Jeffrey Findlay appealed his juvenile offender
adjudication, contending that the district court erred in denying him a jury trial as a matter of
constitutional right. Id. at 21. He maintained that court proceedings concerning acts perpetrated
by juveniles that would be considered felony crimes if committed by adult offenders were
essentially criminal trials under state law. Id. at 22. However, the state supreme court found that
this argument was in "diametric conflict with the intent of the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code."
Id.
95. The Code provided in relevant part:
[The Code] shall be liberally construed to the end that each juvenile coming within its
provisions shall receive the care, custody, guidance, control and discipline, preferably
in the juvenile's own home, as will best serve the juvenile's rehabilitation and the
protection of society. In no case shall any order, judgment or decree of the district
court, in any proceedings under the provisions of this code, be deemed or held to
import a criminal act on the part of any juvenile; but all proceedings, orders,
judgments and decrees shall be deemed to have been taken and done in the exercise of
the parental power of the state.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1601 (repealed 2006) (emphasis added).
96. Findlay, 681 P.2d at 22.
97. Id; see also Hall v. Brown, 284 P. 396, 397 (Kan. 1930) ("[U]nder proceedings purely
statutory, a jury trial is not a matter of right."); State ex rel. Williams v. Herbert, 152 P. 667, 668
(Kan. 1915) (holding that a court's denial of a jury trial in a delinquent proceeding was not
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The court also determined that in the context of juvenile proceedings,
section 38-1656 of the KJOC did not automatically grant the juvenile the right
to request a jury trial.98 Explaining that the statute merely provided the judge
the option of having a jury serve as the fact finder, the court determined that
the trial judge was not required to state a reason for choosing to grant or deny
the request. The Findlay court concluded that granting or denying a request
for a jury trial in a juvenile proceeding under section 38-1656: "(1) is entirely
at the district court's option; (2) involves no rights of either the State or the
respondent; and (3) is not subject to appellate review."100  The holding in
Findlay remained good law in the state of Kansas until 2008.101
II. INRE L.M. GIVES JUVENILES THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN JUVENILE
ADJUDICATIONS
In June 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court in In re
L.M, holding that juveniles have a constitutional right to a jury trial under the
Kansas Constitution, as well as the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution.
10 2
The facts of the case are as follows: L.M., sixteen years of age,' came in
contact with the victim, a female neighbor, late at night when she was walking
home.1°4 Upon his request, she gave L.M. a cigarette; he "then grabbed or
reversible error under the revised state statute); Swarz v. Ramala, 66 P. 649, 650 (Kan. 1901)
(explaining that the trial court did not deny the juvenile "the right of trial by jury in any case in
which he was entitled to demand the same, and is not, for such reason, in violation of the
constitution").
98. Findlay, 681 P.2d at 22. In addition to his contention that the trial court erred in
denying him a jury trial as a matter of constitutional right, the juvenile also argued that the denial
of his request for a jury trial amounted to an abuse of discretion. Id. at 21-22. In relevant part,
the KJOC states:
In all cases involving offenses committed by a juvenile which, if done by an adult,
would make the person liable to be arrested and prosecuted for the commission of a
felony, the judge may order that the juvenile be afforded a trial by jury. Upon an
adjudication, the court shall proceed with disposition.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1656 (repealed 2006).
Findlay argued that this statute provided him the right to request a jury trial, reasoning that
granting or denying the request was an issue of judicial discretion. Findlay, 681 P.2d at 22.
Findlay went on to argue that the judge was required to provide reasons for denying the
defendant's request, so that proper appellate review could occur on the issue of whether the judge
had abused his discretion. Id.
99. Findlay, 681 P.2d at 22-23.
100. Id. at 24.
101. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 172 (Kan. 2008).
102. Id. at 171-72.
103. Id. at 165.
104. In re L.M., No. 96,197, 2006 WL 3775275, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2006) (per
curiam), rev'd, 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008).
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hugged [her], requesting a kiss."'1 5  When she refused his request, he
"allegedly kissed and licked her on the cheek," holding her in an embrace as
she attempted to walk away.10 6 Shortly thereafter, the victim's boyfriend
arrived, she told him what had happened, and he called the police. 1° As a
result, "L.M. was subsequently arrested."'
10 8
During the court's proceedings, L.M. motioned for a jury trial, which the
judge denied.'09 When L.M. was found guilty in a bench trial, he was required
to register as a sex offender, 10 and was ordered to spend eighteen months in a
juvenile correctional facility, followed by a twelve-month aftercare term.I
1
Though L.M.'s placement at the juvenile correctional facility was stayed, he
was ordered to be placed on probation until he reached the age of twenty.
105. Id. When the victim was asked whether L.M. "grabbed any part of her body in a sexual
way the victim stated, 'He just had his arms around me."' Brief of Appellant at 3, In re L.M., No.
06-96197-A (Kan. Ct. App. May 1, 2006).
106. In re L.M, 2006 WL 3775275, at *1. He also recalled that the victim "stated that she
didn't want to call the police" because "she didn't feel it necessary" and that the victim also
agreed that L.M. had merely been "making a 'pass' at her." Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at
2-4.
107. Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 3. L.M. maintained in his briefing that "[t]he
victim did not feel it necessary to hit the Respondent as she was 'just trying to push him away
from [her]."' Id.
108. In re L.M, 2006 WL 3775275, at *1. He was then "taken to a hospital for a medical
evaluation because he had been drinking alcohol." Id
109. Id. In addition to a motion for a jury trial, L.M. unsuccessfully filed a motion to
suppress the statement he made to police. Id.
110. Id. Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that requiring sex offenders to
register with law enforcement authorities is considered a civil, non-punitive remedy geared
towards public safety, rather than a sanction designed to punish the offender. See Smith v. Doe,
538 U.S. 84, 102-03 (2003). But see Bob Egelko, Court: Sex-Offender Law Unfairly Restrictive,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 21, 2008, at B2, available at www.Sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2008/
11/21/BAER149660.DTL (discussing a recent California ruling in which the court held that
residency restrictions placed on sex offenders "are not just public safety measures but also would
punish ex-offenders by forcing them out of their homes"). Justice Ginsburg made a compelling
argument against the rehabilitative merits of sex offender registration in her dissent in Smith:
"And meriting heaviest weight in my judgment, the Act makes no provision whatever for the
possibility of rehabilitation: Offenders cannot shorten their registration or notification period,
even on the clearest demonstration of rehabilitation or conclusive proof of physical
incapacitation." Smith, 538 U.S. at 117 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg's concern
hints at the conflict inherent in a process by which a system that prides itself on rehabilitation and
treatment is able to order a juvenile to register as a sex offender even though he has not been
afforded the same rights as similar adult offenders. See Phoebe Geer, Justice Served? The High
Cost of Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 33, 47 (2008)
("Operating directly contrary to the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system, sex
offender registration and notification laws can publicly and permanently mark juvenile sex
offenders as deviant criminals .... The state's interest in and responsibility for a juvenile's well-
being and rehabilitation is not promoted by a practice that makes a juvenile's sex offenses
public." (footnotes omitted)).
111. Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 2.
112. Id
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L.M. appealed his sentence and his appeal was "taken directly to the Court of
Appeals for the State of Kansas."
113
Before the Kansas Court of Appeals, L.M. argued that the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and certain provisions of the Kansas
Constitution required that the court provide him with a jury trial. 114  The
appellate court declared that it was "duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme
Court precedent, absent some indication that the court is departing from its
previous position," '115 and that it believed the Kansas Supreme Court "has
remained steadfast in its belief that juvenile offender proceedings in this State
are constitutionally sound notwithstanding the absence of a right to a jury
trial. '  Although the appellate court recognized "some rather good
arguments [made by the respondent] as to why the rationale of the Findlay
decision [was] no longer compelling under the current juvenile offender
system," it ultimately sided with the State in holding that juveniles do not have
a constitutional right to a jury trial under the Kansas and U.S. Constitutions
and affirmed the trial court's denial of L.M.'s motion for a trial by jury.117 .
L.M. subsequently filed a petition for review with the Kansas Supreme
Court on the issue of "whether he had a constitutional right to a jury trial
[during his] juvenile offender proceeding."'1 18 The Supreme Court of Kansas
granted his petition.
In his case before the Kansas Supreme Court, L.M. challenged the
constitutionality of several sections of the Kansas Juvenile Justice Code
(KJJC), 1 9 and claimed that certain changes implemented in 2006 "eroded the
113. Id; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1683 (1993) (repealed 2006) ("An appeal from an
order entered by a district magistrate judge shall be to a district judge. The appeal shall be heard
de novo within 30 days from the date the notice of appeal was filed.").
114. In reL.M, 2006 WL 3775275, at *1.
115. Id. (citing In re A.C.W., 988 P.2d 742, 745 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999)). InIn reA.C.W., the
juvenile offender argued that the juvenile adjudication system "[had] become more punitive than
paternal since changes were made [to the system] in 1984." In re A.C.W., 988 P.2d at 745. He
claimed that a jury trial was necessary because the consequences of his adjudication were akin to
a felony conviction. Id. Despite acknowledging that the juvenile's argument was "not without
merit," the court determined that it was "duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent"
and ultimately held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the juvenile's argument concerning his
right to a jury trial. Id.
116. In reL.M, 2006 WL 3775275, at *1.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The KJJC is codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2301 et seq. (2006). Section 38-
2344(d) states that "[i]f the juvenile pleads not guilty, the court shall schedule a time and date for
trial to the court." Id. § 38-2344(d) (Supp. 2007). He also challenged section 38-2357, which
provides:
In all cases involving offenses committed by a juvenile which, if done by an adult,
would make the person liable to be arrested and prosecuted for the commission of a
felony, the judge may upon motion, order that the juvenile be afforded a trial by jury.
Upon the juvenile being adjudged to be a juvenile offender, the court shall proceed with
sentencing.
[Vol. 58:885
The Need for Jury Trials in Juvenile Adjudications
child-cognizant, paternal, and rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile offender
process," which, L.M. argued, should require the court to certify a juvenile's
right to a jury trial under the U.S. Constitution.
120
In response to L.M.'s argument, the court began its analysis by
acknowledging that the state legislature had made significant alterations to the
Kansas children's code since the Findlay court decided similar issues in
1984.121 One of the most notable changes is apparent in section 38-2301,
which sets forth the "goals of the code" and states in relevant part: "The
primary goals of the juvenile justice code are to promote public safety, hold
juvenile offenders accountable for their behavior and improve their ability to
live more productively and responsibly in the community."'
122
When originally enacted in 1982, the KJOC was aimed at rehabilitating
troubled youths and promoting the state's parental role in providing guidance123
and discipline. However, a significant shift in focus was recognized in the
new KJJC, 12 4 which emphasized the importance of protecting the public,
holding juveniles accountable for their decisions and actions, and promoting
the productivity and responsibility of juvenile offenders. 12  The court
explained that the KJJC also integrated statutory language similar to the
language of the Kansas Criminal Code, noting that the purposes and goals of
the updated code "are more aligned with the legislative intent [behind] the
adult (criminal] sentencing statutes.'
126
Id. § 38-2357 (emphasis added).
120. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 167-68 (Kan. 2008). In its brief supporting the State, the
Kansas County and District Attorneys Association (KCDAA) sought to persuade the Kansas
Supreme Court that adopting L.M.'s position would "not cure an alleged deficiency in
fundamental due process for juvenile offenders," but instead, the result would "be as though no
action was taken at all." Brief of Amicus Curiae, Kansas County and District Attorneys
Association (KCDAA) in Support of the State of Kansas, Plaintiff-Appellee at 10-11, In re L.M.,
186 P.3d 164 (No. 06-96197-AS). The KCDAA took the position that "little to no realization of
any perceived benefit [would arise] from a right to juvenile juries." Id. at 10. However, the mere
fact that juveniles may not request jury trials as often as adult criminal defendants, provides little
in the way of support for the argument that they should not have the constitutional right to request
a jury trial when applicable.
121. InreL.M, 186 P.3d at 168.
122. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2301 (emphasis omitted)).
123. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1601 (1993) (repealed 2006) ("[E]ach juvenile coming
within its provisions shall receive the care, custody, guidance, control and discipline, preferably
in the juvenile's own home, as will best serve the juvenile's rehabilitation and the protection of
society. In no case shall any order.., be deemed or held to import a criminal act on the part of
any juvenile; but all proceedings ... shall be deemed to have been taken and done in the exercise
of the parental power of the state.").
124. In 2006, the name of the code was changed from the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code
(KJOC) to the Kansas Juvenile Justice Code (KJJC). In re L.M, 186 P.3d at 168.
125. Id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2301 (Supp. 2007).
126. In re L.M, 186 P.3d at 168. For example, under the KJOC, a juvenile was required to
admit or deny the charges against him or plead nolo contendere; however, under the KJJC, a
juvenile is now forced to plead guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere (the same as is required of
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For example, what the KJOC once referred to as a "state youth center,"
1 27
the KJJC now calls a "[j]uvenile correctional facility,"'1 28 which mirrors the
language of the Kansas Criminal Code's adult "[c]orrectional institution."'
129
The language of the KJJC is also similar to the language of the Kansas
Criminal Code in its reference to the term of commitment to a juvenile
correctional facility as a "term of incarceration."' 30  Thus, the L.M court
determined that the overall language of the KJJC "stresses the similarities
between child and adult offenders far more than it does their differences."
'1 31
The court also recognized that the state legislature modeled the KJJC after
the structure of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines when it promulgated "a
sentencing matrix for juveniles based on the level of the offense committed,"
as well as the juvenile's history of past adjudications. 32  Similar to adult
sentencing guidelines, "the KJJC allows the sentencing judge to depart from
the juvenile placement matrix upon a motion by the State or the sentencing
judge."' 33  Although juvenile sentences that remain within the suggested
sentencing range are not subject to appeal, a juvenile sentence that falls outside
the sentencing range may be appealed, just as a departure from the adult
sentencing guidelines may be appealed. 1
34
The L.M. court also observed that the Kansas Legislature removed several
"protective provisions that made the juvenile system more child-cognizant and
confidential," provisions which were important factors in the McKeiver
decision.135 For example, under the KJJC, court records for juvenile offenders
over the age of thirteen are now subject to the same disclosure requirements as
adults. 136
adults). Id. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1633(b) (1993) (repealed 2006), with id. § 38-
2344(b) (Supp. 2007), and id. § 22-3208(1) (2007). Additionally, what the KJOC referred to as
"dispositional proceedings" are now called "sentencing proceedings" under the KJJC. Compare
id § 38-1605(b) (1993) (repealed 2006), with id. § 38-2305(b) (Supp. 2007).
127. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1602(g) (1993) (repealed 2006).
128. Id. § 38-23020) (Supp. 2007).
129. Id. § 21-4602(e) (2007).
130. See id. § 38-2374(a); see also id. § 21-4603(b) (referring to confinement terms).
131. InreL.M, 186P.3dat169.
132. Id. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2369 (Supp. 2007), with id §§ 21-4701 to -4704
(2007).
133. In re L.M, 186 P.3d at 169. In considering a diversion from the suggested guidelines,
the judge may evaluate certain "aggravating factors," including whether the "victim was
particularly vulnerable"; whether the defendant's conduct "manifested excessive brutality";
whether the offense was "motivated ... by the race, color, religion, ethnicity, national origin or
sexual orientation of the victim"; and whether the crime was one of "extreme sexual violence."
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(c)(2) (preempted on other grounds).
134. In re L.M, 186 P.3d at 169; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2380(b)(2)(A), (b)(3)-(4)
(Supp. 2007).
135. In reL.M, 186 P.3d at 169-70.
136. Id. at 170; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2310(c). The state legislature has removed
the presumption of confidentiality for youth offender hearings by opening them to the public,
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The L.M court ultimately concluded that "because the juvenile justice
system is now patterned after the adult criminal system" and because the
Kansas juvenile system "has become more akin to an adult criminal
prosecution," the changes made in the KJJC "have superseded the McKeiver
and Findlay Courts' reasoning."1 37 Despite recognizing that many sister states
do not extend the right to a jury trial to juvenile offenders, the L.M court
asserted that it was "undaunted in [its] belief that juveniles are entitled to the
right to a jury trial guaranteed to all citizens under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution."'
' 38
III. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS: MCKEIvER V.
PENNSYLVANIA POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ARE NO LONGER APPLICABLE
However sound the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania may have been in 1971, it is no longer applicable because it
portrays "a picture of [a] juvenile court that does not meet today's reality."'
' 39
"[P]ublic safety and the need for accountability" have led to sweeping changes
in the juvenile justice system, leaving juvenile codes more aligned with adult
criminal codes than ever before.1
40
A. Changes in Purpose, Vocabulary, and Placement of State Juvenile Justice
Codes
Historically, proponents of the juvenile court system have justified the lack
of procedural safeguards afforded to juvenile offenders on several grounds.
Advocates of the original juvenile system argued, and the plurality in
McKeiver stressed, that because the juvenile proceedings were designed to
rehabilitate rather than punish, the juvenile did not need rights to shelter him
from "the court's desire to protect [him].' 14 1 However, many juvenile courts
now place more emphasis on protection of the public than rehabilitation of the
minor.142 The sweeping changes made to Kansas's juvenile code provide a
prime example of the changes made to juvenile codes nationwide in response
unless the juvenile is under the age of sixteen or the judge finds that an open hearing would not
serve the youth's best interests. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2353(a).
137. InreL.M, 186 P.3dat 170.
138. Id. at 171.
139. Sanbom, supra note 42, at 231.
140. See Henning, supra note 39, at 533.
141. Sanborn, supra note 42, at 231; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547
(1971) (plurality opinion).
142. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2)(a) (West Supp. 2009). Prior to 1977,
juvenile law in Washington focused "on the offender and the factors which brought him before
the court, rather than on his offense." See State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 775 (Wash. 1979) (en
banc) (Rosellini, J., dissenting). However, in 1977 the Washington legislature revised its juvenile
code, establishing the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(l)-(2).
The legislature strived to "[p]rotect the citizenry from criminal behavior" and to "[m]ake the
juvenile offender accountable for his or her criminal behavior ... " Id. § 13.40.010(2)(a), (c).
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to the high number of violent crimes committed by juveniles. 143 The KJJC
shifted its focus away from rehabilitation and instead centered on protecting
the public, holding juveniles more accountable for their actions, and promoting
their responsibility. 44  Increasingly, the McKeiver Court's reliance on the
strictly rehabilitative nature of the juvenile system no longer applies.
Furthermore, proponents traditionally advocated that constitutional rights
were associated with "words like arrest, prosecution, conviction, and
punishment," and that because the juvenile system made use of an entirely
different vocabulary from that of the adult criminal justice system,
constitutional rights afforded to adults did not apply in juvenile proceedings.
145
However, the KJJC's updated vocabulary exemplifies the trend toward
embedding more criminal-like terms into juvenile codes. For example,
juvenile codes now use such phrases as "term of incarceration,"' 146 "sentenced
143. See, e.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2006, at 1-4 (Nov. 2008),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/ojjdp/221338.pdf ("In 2006, juveniles were involved in 1 in 10
arrests for murder and drug abuse violations and 1 in 4 arrests for a weapons violation, robbery,
motor vehicle theft, larceny-theft, and burglary."); see also Petula Dvorak & Megan Greenwell,
1st Early-Curfew Violators Picked Up: 10 p.m. Cutoff for Juveniles Generates Debate
Throughout District, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2006, at B 1 (discussing the increased enforcement of
an early youth curfew designed "in hopes of curbing an increase in robberies and weapons
offenses committed by juveniles"); Todd Lewan, In Daytona Beach, Juveniles Blamed as Crime
Rate Soars, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 2, 2008, at 6B, available at http://jaxoutloud.com/
forum/showthread.php?t=4828 ("Here and in other cities, chronically high juvenile crime rates-
ranging above the national average of kids under 15 committing 5 percent of violent crime, 7
percent of robberies and 9 percent of burglaries-fray the patience of judges and politicians
..... "); Bianca Prieto, 2 Crime-Fighters Debate Strategies, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2008,
at B I ("Juvenile crime is a major problem-more crimes are being committed by younger people
and are increasingly more violent."); Angela Rozas, Problems, Strategies in City's War on Crime,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/aug/
14/local/chi-commanders-introaugl4 ("Many districts are facing shifting gang populations,
increases in juvenile crime and lackluster community involvement."); Emily Vasquez, Despite a
Decrease in City Crime, Troubling Signs Emerge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at B I (noting that
although crime in New.York City generally decreased by 5% from 2005 to 2006, juvenile arrests
for murder and other major felonies increased by 11.3%).
144. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2301 (Supp. 2007); see also Susan A. Bums, Comment, Is
Ohio Juvenile Justice Still Serving its Purpose?, 29 AKRON L. REV. 335, 361-67 (1996)
(discussing changes made to Ohio's juvenile code aimed at "appeas[ing] the public's outrage with
juvenile crime"); Fain, supra note 1, at 504 ("In response to concerns about increases in the rates
of youth violence and a toothless rehabilitation system, legislatures have amended state statutes to
make the juvenile court more punitive. Such changes include limiting the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court by providing for mandatory waiver into adult court, diluting the respect for privacy
historically given to children in the juvenile court, and shifting the goal of disposition from one of
rehabilitation to one of punishment." (footnote omitted)).
145. See Sanborn, supra note 42, at 231.
146. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:8-66 (West Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.7
(Supp. 2008).
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and committed,"' 147 and "juvenile detention facility."' 148 Clearly, juvenile codes
have begun to incorporate language that was historically reserved for criminal
codes. An argument against extending to juveniles the constitutional rights
afforded adults based on a line of reasoning pertaining to a distinct and
separate vocabulary is now irrelevant.
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, a justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, has
suggested that in moving the Juvenile Justice Code from the Children's Code
portion of the Wisconsin statutes to a position adjoining the criminal code, the
legislature intended to indicate "a change in direction from the unbalanced
approach of the Children's Code, which has the paramount purpose of
promoting the 'best interests of the child' to a balanced approach akin to the
criminal code, which balances rehabilitative interests along with protection of
the public and accountability of the offender."'149 Citing Justice Blackmun's
suggestion that the day may come when the issue of the constitutionality of
jury trials for juveniles will again require discussion, 150 Justice Bradley warned
against "blindly rely[ing] on" McKeiver, a case that speaks to "fundamental
fairness challenges" to juvenile laws that have undergone substantial changes
and shifts in focus since McKeiver was decided.' 5'
B. States Respond to Changing Juvenile Codes
In response to changing juvenile codes, several states have enacted statutes
and decided cases in favor of affording juveniles the right to a jury trial. In
2006, the West Virginia legislature provided juveniles with a statutory right to
147. See VA. CODEANN. § 16.1-278.7.
148. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-202(c) (2008); ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.990(7) (2008); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-1706(1) (West 2007).
149. In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660, 679 (Wis. 1998) (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice
Bradley acknowledged that the juvenile justice system was originally focused on rehabilitating
juvenile offenders; however, she recognized that the goals of the system were markedly altered
when the legislature revised the juvenile system in 1996, making substantial changes to the way
in which juveniles are adjudicated. Id. at 680. Such modifications to the children's code included
stricter provisions governing the confinement of juvenile offenders. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 938.34(4m)(b), 938.355(4)(b) (West 2000). The goals behind the Wisconsin legislature's
modifications to the Children's Code included "protect[ing] citizens from juvenile crime [and]
hold[ing] each juvenile offender directly accountable for his acts or her acts." See id. § 938.01(2)
(West Supp. 2008). The legislature relied on recommendations from the Juvenile Justice Study
Committee, whose report stated in part:
"Both codes [the JJC and the Criminal Code] deal with the same kinds of behavior,
even though there are distinctions in the ages of the perpetrators and the potential
dispositions available. Young offenders would be reminded that while society does not
yet classify their actions as criminal, they are 'almost there."'
In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d at 682 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting
JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY COMM., JUVENILE JUSTICE: A WISCONSIN BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE
11 (1995)).
150. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (plurality opinion).
151. InreHezzieR., 580 N.W.2d at 681.
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a jury trial when accused of committing acts that, if committed by an adult,
would be considered a crime punishable by incarceration.' 52 Additionally, the
Texas legislature has enacted a statute that provides juveniles with the right to
a jury trial during the adjudication phase and mandates that the jury be selected
"in accordance with the requirements in criminal cases."' 53 Although Texas
did not statutorily provide juveniles with a jury at the dispositional phase, the
Texas Court of Appeals has held that if a new offense is adjudicated, even at a
dispositional hearing, a juvenile will have the right to a jury trial.
1 54
New Mexico also enacted a statute that gives juveniles the right to a jury
trial in limited circumstances.' 55 The statute provides in relevant part: "A jury
trial on the issues of alleged delinquent acts may be demanded by the child...
when the offense alleged would be triable by jury if committed by an adult."
' 56
The New Mexico Court of Appeals has explained that juveniles should be
treated in the same manner as adult defendants when determining whether a
juvenile offender's right to a jury trial should apply.
157
C. The Juvenile System is No Longer Entirely Distinct from the Adult Criminal
Justice System
The McKeiver plurality relied on the argument that imposing jury trials in
the juvenile court system would hinder the juvenile court's ability to function
as a system entirely distinct from the adult criminal court system. 58 However,
much has changed since 1971: the juvenile adjudication system has
increasingly become more akin to the criminal system. 59 For example, many
152. See W. VA. CODE § 49-5-6(a) (Supp. 2008) ("[T]he juvenile ... may demand, or the
judge on his or her own motion may order a jury trial on any question of fact, in which the
juvenile is accused of any act or acts of delinquency which, if committed by an adult would
expose the adult to incarceration.").
153. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(b)(6), (c) (Vernon 2008) ("At the beginning of the
adjudication hearing, the juvenile court judge shall explain to the child ... the child's right to trial
by jury.").
154. In re S.H., 846 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex. App. 1992) ("Appellant also argues ... that the
trial court adjudicated him guilty of new offenses and that it may not do so without affording
appellant a jury trial. In this regard, we agree with appellant. A juvenile must waive a jury or be
afforded a jury at an adjudication hearing.").
155. SeeN.M. STAT. § 32A-2-16(A) (1978).
156. Id.
157. State v. Benjamin C., 781 P.2d 795, 799 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the juvenile
defendant has the right to a jury trial because an adult facing the same charges would be entitled
to a jury trial).
158. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("There is
a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will
remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to
what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.").
159. See, e.g., Jenny B. Davis, Juries for Juveniles?, I No. 3 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 3 (2002)
(explaining significant changes made to the Louisiana juvenile justice system including counting
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courts allow juvenile adjudications to be factored into an adult's subsequent
criminal court sentencing, despite the fact that the relevant juvenile
adjudications were tried to the bench because juveniles are not constitutionally
guaranteed a jury trial. 6°
D. Early Skepticism of the Juvenile System
In 1966, the Kent Court admitted that "there can be no doubt of the original
laudable purposes of juvenile courts," yet recognized that critics have "raise[d]
serious questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough
against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from
the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults."' 61 The Court also
noted that "some juvenile courts . . . lack the personnel, facilities and
techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State in a parens
patriae capacity ... .,162 Thus, despite the Court's retreat from this skepticism
in McKeiver only five years later, the flaws inherent in the juvenile justice
system were evident early on in the Court's juvenile adjudication
jurisprudence.
E. What Can Juries Offer that Judges Cannot?
It is of vital importance to recognize that juries can provide a clean slate in a
way that may be difficult for juvenile court judges. 163 Juries are more likely toacquit on evidence that does not satisfy the standard of beyond a reasonable
juvenile adjudications toward adult sentence enhancements and allowing the public greater access
to information about juvenile offenders).
160. Sanborn, supra note 42, at 237. In 2005, the Court of Appeals of Washington held that
a defendant's prior juvenile adjudications could properly be considered prior convictions for
purposes of sentence enhancement. State v. Weber, 112 P.3d 1287, 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005),
aff'd, 149 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2006). The Minnesota and Indiana Supreme Courts have also
determined that non-jury juvenile adjudications can be taken into consideration for purposes of
increasing adult sentences. See Molly Gulland Gaston, Note, Never Efficient, But Always Free:
How the Juvenile Adjudication Question is the Latest Sign that Almendarez-Torres v. United
States Should Be Overturned, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1176 (2008); see also Redi Kasollja,
First Circuit Upholds Constitutionality of Juvenile Convictions as Predicate Offenses Under the
Armed Career Criminal Act, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 369, 373 (2008) (discussing an emerging
circuit split regarding the constitutionality of taking prior juvenile adjudications into account
under the Armed Career Criminal Act's sentencing enhancement provision).
161. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966); see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
529 (1975) ("We believe it is simply too late in the day to conclude ... that a juvenile is not put
in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has committed acts that
violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in such
a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many years.").
162. Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-56.
163. Sanborn, supra note 42, at 236. Juries, unlike judges, do not have access to the juvenile
offender's prior records and are not familiar with the juvenile from prior stages in the court
process or prior adjudications. See id. Furthermore, juries are not presented with prejudicial and
inadmissible evidence that is often presented at preliminary hearings, and juries do not know
which prosecutors deal solely with repeat juvenile offenders. Id.
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doubt because they have no vested interest in punishing a particular juvenile,
they are not "easily vulnerable to prosecutorial pressures to adjudicate
delinquents," and they have an "overall tendency to acquit more frequently
than judges."'1 64  In a famous study of criminal trials in the 1950s, Harry
Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, relying on judges' questionnaire responses,
determined that juries were more inclined to acquit "when judges would
convict much more often than juries tended to convict when judges would
acquit. ' 65 Using a criminal case database to partially replicate Kalven and
Zeisel's study, similar results were reached in 2005; the study further found
that overall, "judges tend to convict more than juries.
'' 66
Juries often "show greater lenity and thereby give our criminal justice
system more flexibility [b 7 allowing] a more humane imposition and
distribution of punishment." 67 It has been argued that providing juries in
juvenile adjudications "would allow the child to be judged as an individual,
rather than as just another member of a disreputable class who had previously
appeared in juvenile court."' 168 Thus, jury trials provide a method of
adjudication that comports with the original ambition of the juvenile system,
which was to provide individualized treatment to each youth offender.1
69
F. Jury Trials Are Central to the Criminal Justice System
Less than five years before the decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the
Supreme Court articulated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone."' 170 A year later, the Court concluded that
"trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of
justice . . ,,171 Thus, the McKeiver Court's decision denying juveniles the
right to a jury trial seems entirely inconsistent with the Court's prior and




165. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial
Replication ofKalven and Zeisel's The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 171, 172 (2005)
(citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 58 (1966)). Kalven and
Zeisel's study "is acknowledged to be the first large-scale systematic study of the jury" and
though it is nearly fifty years old, the study "remains in many scholars' minds the most
significant." Id.
166. Id. at 173. The 2005 study compiled the views concerning the "closeness of the case" of
four different categories of participants, including "judges, jurors, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys." Id.
167. Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 342.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 22, at 160.
170. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13(1967).
171. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
172. Moreover, the right to a jury trial is rooted in English common law and aims "'[t]o
guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers .... ' Apprendi v. New
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For decades, the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial has been considered
a fundamental right. 173 The U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated on numerous
occasions the necessity of providing criminal defendants with the right to a
jury of their peers, and has explained that the right to a jury trial mandates that
the defendant be provided with a "fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent'
jurors."' 174 Additionally, the Court has affirmed that "[t]he right to a jury trial
is fundamental to our system of criminal procedure, and States are bound to
enforce the Sixth Amendment's guarantees as [the Court] interpret[s] them."
175
The Supreme Court's rich history of interpreting and applying the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial discloses "a long tradition attaching great
importance to the concept of relying on a body of one's peers to determine
guilt or innocence as a safeguard against arbitrary law enforcement."' 76 Thus,
the Court's decision in McKeiver, denying juvenile offenders the right to a jury
trial under the U.S. Constitution, is in direct contrast to the Court's numerous
decisions detailing the immense importance of the concept of trial by jury to
our legal system.
IV. CONCLUSION
A distinguished trial court judge once noted that "[w]hen evaluating the
importance of a proceeding and the constitutional rights which attach at that
moment, the test is not what label is applied to the proceeding, it is the
potential consequences that could flow from it."' 77 A lingering concern among
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed. 1873)). Since the English settlers brought the concept of
the right to a jury trial with them to America, every state constitution has adopted the right to a
jury trial in criminal proceedings. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152-53. The Declaration of
Independence also conveyed "'solemn objections to the King's ... depriving [citizens] in many
cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury."' Id at 152 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776)).
173. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 ("[T]rial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice ...."). The Supreme Court noted that the jury trial's function of
safeguarding against unreasoned law enforcement "lies at the core of [the Court's] dedication to
the principles of jury determination of guilt or innocence." Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,
373-74 (1972).
174. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). The Irvin Court explained that the right to
a fair trial extends to all criminal defendants "regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged,
the apparent guilt of the offender or the station in life which he occupies." Id.
175. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004); see also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155
(asserting that the right to a jury trial "reflect(s] a profound judgment about the way in which law
should be enforced and justice administered").
176. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970); see also Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 551 (1976) ("'In the ultimate analysis, only the jury can strip a man of his liberty or his
life."' (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722)); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 ("[Tlrial by jury in criminal
cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice ...."); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.").
177. Hon. Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a
Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REv. 57, 59 n.7 (1992).
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those in favor of extending a constitutional right to a jury trial to youth
offenders is the importance and often lack of recognition that the overarching
consideration is whether the juvenile stands to suffer a deprivation of his
rights. 178 If we continue, as the recent trend suggests, to close the gap between
juvenile and criminal codes, then we must extend to juveniles all procedural
due process rights enjoyed by adult defendants-most importantly the right to
a jury trial.
Justice Harry Blackmun concluded his opinion for the McKeiver plurality
with the following acknowledgment: "If the formalities of the criminal
adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system,
there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps the ultimate
disillusionment will come one day . . . 179 Since the mid-1990s, states have
toughened their stance on juvenile offenders and state juvenile systems have
focused on accountability and public safety.' 80 The day that Justice Blackmun
predicted has arrived.
178. See id
179. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (plurality opinion).
180. See John Gibeaut, A Jury Question: Jurors Should Judge Youths in Juvenile Court,
Some Say, 85 A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (July 1999). After striking down on state due process grounds a
1997 Louisiana law that allowed a juvenile who was determined delinquent, yet not convicted of
a crime, to be transferred to an adult prison, Louisiana Chief Justice Pascal F. Calogero noted:
"'The issue now becomes how much of the unique nature of the juvenile procedures can be
eroded before due process requires that the juveniles be afforded all the guarantees of adult
criminals under the Constitution, including the right to trial by jury."' Id.
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